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THE CONSTITUTION AND 
PRECLUSION/RES JUDICATA 
Allan D. Vestal* 
THE interrelation of lawsuits is one of the most troublesome, yet least commented upon, areas of the law.1 The ramifica-
tions are great; related lawsuits may be pending concurrently, 
either brought by the same individual-repetitive litigation2--or 
brought by different parties-reactive litigation.3 Such lawsuits 
may occur serially over a period of time. The courts are then 
faced with problems which have traditionally been discussed in 
terms of res judicata, bar, merger, or estoppel.4 It is impossible 
to cover the whole area or even a sizable part of it in a single 
article, but it is feasible to examine one facet which certainly war-
rants consideration: the constitutional involvement in the inter-
relation of suits. 
Before plunging into the topic, it is necessary to consider the 
terminology used in the discussion. It seems apparent that the 
courts and commentators are not happy with the terms now being 
used.1'• There is no clarity or definitude in these terms, especially 
res judicata and estoppel. In recent years the courts have tended 
to use the term "preclusion" when referring to a situation in 
which litigation is foreclosed.6 To clarify the matter further, m 
• Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.-Ed. 
1 See BOWER, THE DoC'IlUNE OF REs JuDICATA (1924); EVEREST &: STRODE, ESTOPPEL (3d 
ed. 1923); Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929); Developments in the Law-
Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 818 (1952). 
2 See Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IowA L. R.Ev. 525 (1960). 
3 See Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11 (1961). 
4. In the introductory note to Chapter Three on "Former Adjudication," it is pointed 
out that "the term 'res judicata' is used ... in a broad sense as including merger, bar, 
collateral estoppel and direct estoppel." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 160 (1942). When a 
judgment is in favor of plaintiff, there is a merger of the cause of action into the 
judgment. Id. § 47. When the defendant wins on the merits, the judgment acts as a bar 
to plaintiff's cause of action. Id. §§ 48-54. When there is a subsequent controversy on a 
different cause of action, but involving some of the same questions, collateral estoppel 
prohibits relitigation of matters actually litigated previously. Id. §§ 68-72. 
5 Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, joint Reporter of the Restatement of Judgments 
with Professor Warren A. Seavey, indicated that "It was with some hesitation that we 
determined to use the term 'collateral estoppel.' There is no doubt that the word 
estoppel is frequently used very loosely .••. We toyed with the notion of using the term 
'precluded by judgment,' or of saying that there is a 'collateral preclusion.' " Scott, Col-
lateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4 (1942). 
6 See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 194 (1962) ("We hold that the courts of South 
Carolina were not precluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause from determining the 
best interest of these children and entering a decree accordingly.'') (Emphasis added.); 
Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209, 212, 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1962); Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 
224 F.2d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 
[33] 
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this discussion the term claim preclusion will be used to indicate 
a situation in which a claim has been decided conclusively and 
the matter is not open to further litigation. Issue preclusion will 
be used to describe the situation in which a single issue has been 
so decided. 7 It is hoped that these terms will help in analyzing the 
cases and in reaching meaningful conclusions in the area. 
CONSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
The decision to give or refuse to give preclusive effect to a 
judgment may involve a number of different constitutional con-
cepts. Certainly four sections of the federal constitution should 
be considered in any analysis of the general area of preclusion: 
full faith and credit, due process, the right to trial by jury, and 
equal protection of the laws. 8 
Full Faith and Credit: Courts Involved 
In a federal system such as ours it is possible to have four dif-
ferent situations involving courts of different jurisdictions in 
which a claim of preclusion is made. The first-preclusive-ac-
tion may be in either a state or federal court, and the second-in 
which the claim of preclusion is made-may be in either a state 
or federal court. This means then that (1) the first and second 
both may be in state courts, (2) the first may be in a state court 
and the second in a federal court, (3) the first may be in a federal 
court and the second in a state court, or ( 4) both the first and the 
second may be in federal courts. 
The full faith and credit section of Article IV of the Consti-
tution, one of the crucial concepts in this area, states that "Full 
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
1948) ("[A] judgment for the plaintiff in an action against one tort feasor acting in 
concert with others does not preclude the plaintiff from later suing another.') (Emphasis 
added.); Breswick &: Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hassenplug v. 
Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("The doctrine of res judicata 
admittedly precludes parties from demonstrating what is or may be the truth.') (Em-
phasis added.); Lynch v. Lynch, 250 Iowa 407, 412, 94 N.W .2d 105, 109 (1959); Frost v. 
Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 696, 23 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (1940) ("The Nevada action could have 
been defeated by proof that the marriage of the parties was invalid on account of the 
invalidity of the Mexican decree. Having failed to make proof of that fact in the 
Nevada action, the plaintiff is precluded from litigating the issue now.') (Emphasis added.). 
7 The phrase "issue preclusion" has not been used by the courts intentionally, but in 
Frost v. Frost, supra note 6, the court inadvertently came close, stating "[T]he plaintiff 
is precluded from litigating the issue now.'' 
s See U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause); U.S. CoNsr. amends. 
V &: XIV, § 1 (due process clauses); U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII (right to trial by jury clause); 
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 (equal protection under the law clause). 
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Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof." This provision means that when the first suit is in a 
state court and the second is also in a state court, there is a con-
stitutional requirement of Full Faith and Credit. The constitu-
tional provision, however, does not mention federal courts. 
The full faith and credit clause has been supplemented by 28 
U.S.C. section 1738, which provides: 
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies 
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and 
credit in every court within the United States and its Terri-
tories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they 
are taken."9 
Several things should be noted about this statutory provision. 
First, it encompasses more than just the courts of the states.10 Sec-
ond, it provides for the giving of full faith and credit by the fed-
eral courts. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "The 
full faith and credit clause, together with the legislation pursuant 
thereto, applies to judicial proceedings of a state court drawn in 
question in an independent proceeding in the federal courts."11 
As this statute makes the concept of full faith and credit applicable 
in federal courts, it can be stated that, when the first suit is in a 
state court and the second is in a federal court, the requirement 
of full faith and credit is statutory in origin.12 
If the first suit is in a federal court and the second is in a 
state court, what then of the doctrine of full faith and credit? The 
constitutional provision does not apply; neither does the statutory 
implementation. However, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Stoll v. Gottlieb, stated: 
"The Congress enacted, as one of the earlier statutes, pro-
visions for giving effect to the judicial proceedings of the 
courts. This has long had its present form. This statute is 
broader than the authority granted by Article Four, section 
0 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1958). 
10 See Chittick v. Chittick, 332 Mass. 554, 126 N.E.2d 495 (1955) (full faith and credit 
accorded to records in Virgin Islands District Court); Butler v. Butler, 179 Misc. 651, 40 
N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (full faith and credit accorded to Territory of Hawaii). 
11 American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932). 
12 See Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868, 870-71 
(1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 
U.S. 825 (1948). 
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one, of the Constitution to prescribe the manner of proof and 
the effect of the judicial proceedings of states. Under it the 
judgments and decrees of the federal courts in a state are 
declared to have the same dignity in the courts of that state 
as those of its own courts in a like case and under similar cir-
cumstances. "13 
The Court concluded that the matter before it entered the federal 
court under the Bankruptcy Act, and that "effect as res judicata 
is to be given the federal order, if it is concluded it was an effec-
tive judgment in the court of its rendition." "The problem before 
the Supreme Court of Illinois," the Court stated, "was not one of 
full faith and credit but of res judicata."14 This was a case in 
which the state supreme court had refused to give effect to a plea 
of res judicata arising from order of a federal bankruptcy court; 
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mat-
ter was res judicata.15 A number of state decisions have either 
held or suggested that full faith and credit must be given by state 
courts to the decisions of federal courts,16 but these decisions do 
not seem to be too well considered. 
The fourth possibility is the situation in which both the first 
and second courts are federal. What then of the concept of full 
faith and credit? Is there any such requirement-constitutional 
or statutory-as between federal courts? In Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. International Harvester Co.17 the question of the effect to 
be given a judgment of one federal court in a second federal court 
was raised. The court, considering the matter at length, reasoned 
as follows: 
"On the one hand it may be urged that the question is essen-
tially one of faith and credit. The extent of the collateral 
consequences of a judgment is a matter of law and, in the 
absence of a statute, judge made law .... [T]he question of 
the effect of the prior judgment is to be determined in the 
first instance by the law of [the state] where the court render-
ing it sat. A judgment rendered by a federal court is entitled 
to the same faith and credit as one rendered by the court of the 
13 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938). See Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9 (1882); Dupasseur v. 
Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 (1874). 
14 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938). 
15 Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra note 14, reversing Gottlieb v. Crowe, 368 Ill. 88, 12 N.E.2d 
881 (1938). 
16 See Chittick v. Chittick, 332 Mass. 554, 126 N.E.2d 495 (1955); Butler v. Butler, 
179 Misc. 651, 40 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 103, 96 
N.E.2d 721, 724 (1951) (dictum). 
17 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941). 
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state where it is sitting .... While the constitutional mandate 
of full faith and credit (Art. IV § I) is applicable to the states 
only, the federal statute requires faith and credit 'in every 
court within the United States.' The credit which this judg-
ment must receive is that to which it is entitled 'by law or 
usage' in the courts of the place where rendered. That is a 
matter of the common law of [the state where the federal 
court sat], but is a matter which has not, so far as we have 
been able to find, been dealt with by [such] courts. In the 
absence of contrary local decisions the rule set out above is 
the one we believe to be sound and to which we give our 
approval."18 
The court cites Erie R.R. v. Tompkins19 in connection with this 
argument. It is hard to believe that the relationship between fed-
eral courts is to be decided by state law; rather, one would believe 
that this is a purely federal matter to be governed by federally 
developed principles.20 
The court in the Caterpillar case further stated: 
"On the other hand, the matter here is one between two 
courts of the same sovereignty, the United States of Americah 
If one federal court failed to give effect to the judgment of 
another federal court the Supreme Court of the United States,. 
as the head of the judicial system of the United States would 
compel it to do so because 'they are many members yet but 
one body'. . . . Whichever route one travels he reaches the 
same destination .... Judge Biggs believes that the problem 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs presents no problem of 
faith and credit and that the recognition in one federal court 
of the decrees of another comes through the fact that both 
courts are arms of the same sovereignty."21 
The impact of full faith and credit on successive suits, there-
fore, may be summarized as follows: (I) if both suits are in state-
courts, the constitutional mandate covers the situation; (2) if the-
first is in a state court and the second in a federal court, the statu-
tory provision clearly covers; (3) if the first action is in a federal 
court and the second in a state court, full faith and credit does 
not apply, but the problem is one of res judicata; (4) if both suits 
are in the federal courts, the better view is that the matter is not 
18 Id. at 85-86. 
10 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
20 See Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IOWA L. R.Ev. 248 (1963). 
21 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 
1941). 
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one of full faith and credit, but that recognition must be given 
because "both courts are arms of the same sovereignty." 
It should also be noted that the constitutional concept of full 
faith and credit does not apply to judgments handed down by the 
courts of foreign countries. The general concept of preclusion 
may be applicable or some version of comity may control, but 
these do not rise to the stature of a constitutional principle.22 
Full Faith and Credit: Doctrine 
Simply stated, the full faith and credit concept requires that 
the judgment handed down in State A be given the same effect 
in State B that it would have been given in State A. This con-
cept means that if an action has been maintained in one state and 
a second suit is brought in a second state involving the same issues, 
the Constitution requires the giving in the second state of the 
same preclusive effect to the judgment rendered in the first suit 
that it would have been given in the first state. The second court 
has no discretion in the matter; it is bound so to respect the de-
cision rendered by the first court. This means that the same pre-
elusive effect must be given in terms of issue preclusion, claim 
preclusion, the parties or persons covered, and the issues in-
volved. 23 The entire body of law which has developed in the first 
state concerning the preclusive effect given to judgments must be 
;ipplied. 
There is reason to believe that the requirements of full faith 
and credit do not end with this incorporation of the law of the 
first state. On occasion the Supreme Court has held that the doc-
trine applies in situations where the party to be bound was not 
at all connected with the first suit. For example, in Williams v. 
North Carolina, the first Williams case,24 the Court held that the 
state of North Carolina was bound by the judgment rendered be-
tween private litigants in Nevada. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. 
22 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912) (full faith and credit clause 
inapplicable to judgments of foreign states); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) 
where the court stated: " 'Comity' in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. 
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws." See also Reese, The Status in This Country of Judg• 
ments Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 783 (1950); Smit, International Res Judicata 
and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev. 44 (1962). 
23 See In re Potts, 1:12 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir. 1944); Maager v. Hoye, 122, F. Supp. 
932, 934 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Butler v. Butler, 253 Iowa 1084, 1106, 114 N.W.2d 595, 608 
{1962); Phillips v. Cooper, 253 Iowa 359, 363, 112 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1961). 
24 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
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Hunt25 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of full faith 
and credit applied although the parties were different from those 
in the first action and were not in privity. The dissent called 
attention to this fact.26 In Standard Oil Co. v. New ]ersey21 the 
opinion indicated that the party from whom the property was 
taken by escheat would be protected by the full faith and credit 
clause even against another state which might try to reach the 
property. This latter state, of course, would not have been a party 
to the first suit. The Court stated: 
"The debts or demands represented by the stock and divi-
dends having been taken from the appellant company by a 
valid judgment of New Jersey, the same debts or demands 
against appellant cannot be taken by another state. The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double escheat."28 
On the other hand, the Court, in referring to full faith and 
credit in the second Williams case,29 concluded: 
"But those not parties to a litigation ought not to be fore-
closed by the interested actions of others; especially not a 
State which is concerned with the vindication of its own social 
policy and has no means, certainly no effective means, to pro-
tect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its 
borders."30 
How broad, then, is the impact of the full faith and credit 
21> 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
26 See id. at 453, where Black, J., stated in his dissenting opinion that: "In the in-
stant case the situation is entirely different. The parties are not the same; the 
issues are not the same; and the two proceedings are not under the same Act. . . . The 
employer was not a party to that proceeding; nor was there 'privity' between the in-
surer and the employer since the insurer's liability did not extend to rights which the 
employee might have against his employer under Louisiana law." See Cheatham, Res 
Judicata and the Full Faith Credit Clause: .Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 330, 349 (1944), where the author points out that the opinion of the minority 
was silent "on the test to be employed in determining privity under the full faith and 
credit clause." 
27 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
28 Id. at 443. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). The 
Western Union case involved an attempt by the state of Pennsylvania to require that 
unclaimed obligations of the defendant escheat to the state. Justice Black, in holding for 
the defendant, stated: "['V]hen a state court's jurisdiction purports to be based, as 
here, on the presence of property within the State, the holder of such property is deprived 
of due process of law if he is compelled to relinquish it without assurance that he will 
not be held liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who 
is not bound by the first judgment ..•. Western Union was not protected by the 
Pennsylvania judgment, for a state court judgment need not be given full faith and credit 
by other States as to parties or property not subject to the jurisdiction of the court that 
rendered iL" Id. at 75. 
20 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 895 (1945). 
ao Id. at 230. 
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clause? Clearly, the parties and certain related individuals may 
be bound.31 Beyond these, however, others may be required to 
give full faith and credit to a judgment with which they have had 
no connection. Determining who is included in this group is ex-
tremely difficult. This problem might arise where a judgment was 
handed down in one forum but was not given preclusive effect in 
that forum vis-a-vis the person who wished to attack the judg-
ment. 32 This might involve a person who was not a party and 
therefore not bound. In this situation-where it is not given pre-
elusive effect in the first forum-it might be urged that it should 
be given preclusive effect vis-a-vis the party raising the issue in the 
second. The Court has not clearly faced the question, much less 
indicated any sort of a solution to this problem. Obviously the 
Court will have to face this matter at some time and attempt to 
formulate a rationale to give meaning and predictability to the 
area. Up to the present time, however, there is no clear indica-
tion of the way the Court will eventually settle the matter of the 
reach, person-wise, of the full faith and credit clause. The best 
that can be said is that, when the requirements of the federal sys-
tem demand it, the Court can apply the full faith and credit clause 
to litigants not normally bound by a prior judgment. This may 
entail an expansion of the full faith and credit clause to give pre-
elusive effect greater than that found in the state in which the 
judgment is rendered. It is entirely possible that the Court might 
decide that the cause of federalism or nationalism requires that a 
certain judgment be given more preclusive effect than it might 
normally receive. The Constitution would seem to allow this sort 
of expansion when necessary. This, seemingly, is the message of 
those cases which would expand the preclusiveness beyond the 
scope which usually attaches to such judgments.83 
It should be clearly understood that the full faith and credit 
statute-28 U.S.C. section 173834-is not limited to claim preclu-
sion; its reach is much greater than that.35 In applying the constitu-
tional provision and the statute enacted to carry it out, one federal 
court has stated: 
Sl The author presently intends to deal in a subsequent article with the problem of 
what persons may be precluded even though they were not parties to or did not partici-
pate in the prior suit. 
32 See note 28 supra. 
33 See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra. 
34 28 u.s.c § 1738 (1958). 
35 See Chicago, R.I. &: Pac. R.R. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926); Everett v. Everett, 
215 U.S. 203 (1909). 
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"[W]e think the conclusion inescapable that the decree must 
have the same effect when relied upon in the court of another 
state. The full faith and credit clause 'compels that contro-
versies be settled so that where a state court has jurisdiction 
of the parties and subject matter the judgment controls in 
other states to the same extent as it does in the state where 
rendered.' Therefore, this decree prevents the litigation of 
a matter already determined in New York in the courts of 
another state for the collateral estoppel division [issue preclu-
sion] of res judicata is included within that clause.''36 
As to courts in different states in the United States, the case-
made law of preclusion is altered by the constitutional concept 
of full faith and credit. This is primary. The forum court cannot 
apply solely its own idea of preclusion; rather it must, under the 
Constitution, look to the state handing down the first decision and 
find what its doctrine of preclusion is as to the matter involved 
and apply that law as a minimum. The law of the state where 
the first judgment is handed down controls on the matter of pre-
clusion to this extent. This the Constitution requires.37 If the 
forum court wishes to give additional preclusive effect to the judg-
ment rendered in the foreign jurisdiction, this may be permissible. 
At this point due process may come into play.38 
The most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the mat-
ter of full faith and credit is found in Ford v. Ford.39 In a unani-
mous decision, it was held that a South Carolina court was not 
bound by an order rendered by a court in Virginia in an earlier 
proceeding. The Virginia order had recited that the parties had 
agreed concerning the custody of their children. In the South 
Carolina action brought some nine months after the termination 
of the earlier suit the wife brought an action to get full custody 
of the children. The husband pleaded among other things the 
defense that plaintiff had "violated the Order of the Court of rec-
ord in Richmond, Virginia.'' The trial court held for the plaintiff-
mother and rejected the husband's argument that the order of 
dismissal was res judicata as to the matter. The Supreme Court 
of South Carolina reversed and held that, since the wife would 
have been bound by the Virginia judgment in a Virginia court, 
she would be bound in the South Carolina proceeding. The court 
36 United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 620-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 
(1948). 
37 Sec section dealing with the limitations on full faith and credit infra. 
38 Sec section dealing with the due process clause infra. 
30 371 U.S. 187 (1962). 
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felt that this was an application of the full faith and credit clause. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing, stated: 
"Whatever the effect given such dismissals where only private 
interests of parties are involved, cases involving custody of 
children raise very different considerations. We are of the 
opinion that Virginia law, which does not treat a contract 
between the parents as a bar to the court's jurisdiction in 
custody cases, would similarly not treat as res judicata the dis-
missal in this case. . . . 
"[W]e do not believe that, in view of Virginia's strong 
policy of safeguarding the welfare of the child, a court of that 
State would consider itself bound by a mere order of dis-
missal where, as here, the trial judge never even saw, much 
less passed upon, the parents' private agreement for custody 
and heard no testimony whatever upon which to base a judg-
ment as to what would be best for the children. 
"We hold that the courts of South Carolina were not pre-
cluded by the Full Faith and Credit Clause from determining 
the best interest of these children and entering a decree 
accordingly. " 40 
It should be noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court had 
treated the matter as one of full faith and credit, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States said simply that the courts of South 
Carolina were not precluded by that clause from "determining 
the best interest of these children and entering a decree according-
ly." This is not to say that the courts of South Carolina could not 
give preclusive effect to a Virginia judgment; it is only saying that 
the full faith and credit clause does not require the giving of such 
preclusive effect. The former is a matter of South Carolina law; 
the latter is a constitutional matter which incorporates Virginia 
law. 
Full Faith and Credit: Judgment Not on Merits 
Where a precluding judgment not actually decided on the 
merits has been handed down in one jurisdiction, a litigant may 
attempt to raise the same claim in a second jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action twice in one 
jurisdiction with a two-dismissal rule;41 or a defendant may fail 
to assert a compulsory counterclaim.42 What effect will these deci-
40 Id. at 192, 194. 
41 See FED. R. C1v. P. 41-(a)(l). 
42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
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sions-in which the merits of the claims were not reached-have 
upon later actions brought in different jurisdictions? Does the full 
faith and credit clause require that the second court recognize the 
decision of the first as precluding further litigation of the matter? 
It would seem that the clause requires the second court to give the 
same effect to the judgment that it would have had in the first juris-
diction.43 In the first it would have had a preclusive effect, so it 
should have such an effect in the second. This should be true in the 
cases of both examples: the two-dismissal rule44 and the compulsory 
counterclaim provision.45 
Limitations on Full Faith and Credit 
The concept of full faith and credit is subject to certain excep-
tions or limitations. These might be listed as (I) a jurisdictional 
limitation, (2) a limitation based upon the policy of the forum 
state, and (3) the limitations inhering in the first judgment. 
If the first judgment is rendered by a court that does not have 
jurisdiction over the precluded party and this issue has not been 
litigated in the first proceeding, then the judgment is void and of 
no preclusive effect, and full faith and credit need not be given to 
such a judgment. The Supreme Court, in Hansberry v. Lee, reiter-
ated this principle: 
"It is a principle of general application in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in 
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process. . . . A judgment rendered in such circumstances 
is not entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitu-
tion and statute of the United States ... prescribe .... "46 
43 See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
44 See Commentary, The "Two-Dismissal" Rule, 4 FED. RULES SERv. 4la.123, at 927 
(1941); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 41.04 (2d ed. 1951). Contra, Missouri Pac. Transp. 
Co. v. Talley, 199 Ark. 835, 136 S.W.2d 688 (1940). In referring to the Missouri Pacific 
decision the Commentary, supra, stated: "The Arkansas Supreme Court . . . dismissed 
[the contention that two prior dismissals in the federal court were res judicata and a 
bar to the state court action] on the seemingly untenable ground that Rule 41a did not 
make such dismissals an adjudication on the merits. Certiorari was prayed for on the 
theory that Rule 41a was a 'law of the United States' within the meaning of Article VI, 
§ 2 of the Constitution, and was controlling on state courts; but unfortunately the 
petition was dismissed on motion of the petitioner." 
45 See United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958) (failure of 
Government to plead claim for charter hire as a compulsory counterclaim in prior action 
before Court of Claims bar to instant suit before Court of Appeals); Reconstruction 
Fin. Corp. v. First Nat'I Bank, 21 FED. RULES SERv. 13a.3, Case 1 (D. Wyo. May 13, 1955); 
E. J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 21 FED. RULES SERV. 13a.ll, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 
1955). 
40 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940). 
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Of course, if when the matter was litigated between the parties the 
court erroneously held that it had jurisdiction, then the judgment 
handed down in all probability47 cannot be collaterally attacked 
in the second jurisdiction. The erroneous ruling must be directly 
attacked by appeal or in the court making the ruling.48 
It should be noted, however, that in the opinion of some courts 
the jurisdictional matter is so fundamental as to override the con-
cept of full faith and credit in some circumstances. Recently, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated in Duke v. Durfee:49 
"[T]he full faith and credit clause, while foreclosing repeti-
tious litigation of non-jurisdictional matters, does not preclude 
a second forum's inquiry into questions of the first court's per-
sonal or subject-matter jurisdiction. This was the holding of 
several early Supreme Court cases. The principle was compre-
hensively restated in the usually cited case of Thompson v. 
Whitman, 1874, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 469 ... and has 
been perpetuated by later cases. . . . Thus, there is no full 
faith and credit requirement that, in the case before us, a 
Missouri court-and thereby the federal district court in 
Missouri ... -must accept the Nebraska judgment as final."50 
This seems to suggest that the full faith and credit doctrine must 
give way to a re-examination of the jurisdictional basis of the first 
action. It should be noted that this decision runs contrary to the 
great weight of authority on the matter of issue preclusion involv-
ing jurisdiction. 51 The decision stands almost alone as to full faith 
and credit and preclusion of the jurisdictional issue.52 
Under some circumstances the policy of the forum state may 
be so strong on a particular point that it may be able to avoid the 
47 See Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868, 871 (1st 
Cir. 1960), where the court stated: "Due process does not give parties the right to 
litigate the same question twice. . • • [I']he principle that there shall be but one 
adjudication of an issue between the same parties covers the issue of jurisdiction over 
a defendant's person, provided the court first deciding that issue . . . did not make so 
gross a mistake as to be impossible 'in a rational administration of justice.' " But see 
Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962) (discussed infra). 
48 See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938) (collateral attack denied in another state 
court); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (collateral attack 
denied in another federal court). 
49 Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 946 (1963), 
63 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1963), 37 TUL. L. REv. 335 (1963), 49 VA. L. REV. 180 (1963). 
50 Id. at 212. 
51 See Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503 (1941); Chicot County Drainage 
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377 (1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 
U.S. 66, 78 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1938); Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940) (dictum). 
52 The reasonable prediction as to the final determination of the Duke case would 
appear to be a reversal by the Supreme Court on certiorari. 
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doctrine of full faith and credit and refuse to honor the judgment 
handed down in the first state. The United States Supreme Court 
has suggested this possibility in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,53 
where the court stated: 
"Even though we assume for present purposes that the com-
mand of the Constitution and the statute is not all-embracing, 
and that there may be exceptional cases in which the judg-
ment of one state may not override the laws and policy of 
another, this Court is the final arbiter of the extent of the 
exceptions .... And we pointed out in Williams v. North 
Carolina ... that 'the actual exceptions have been few and 
far between. . . .' "54 
Williams55 is the definitive case as to allowing collateral attacks 
on judgments contrary to the general principle of full faith and 
credit. The Supreme Court stated: 
"It is one thing to reopen an issue that has been settled 
after appropriate opportunity to present their contentions has 
been afforded to all who had an interest in its adjudication. 
This applies also to jurisdictional questions. After a contest 
these cannot be relitigated as between the parties. . . . But 
those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by 
the interested actions of others; especially not a State which 
is concerned with the vindication of its own social policy and 
has no means, certainly no effective means, to protect that 
interest against the selfish action of those outside its bor-
ders."50 
The Court held that North Carolina was not required to yield 
"her State policy" and need not give full faith and credit to the 
Nevada decree. 
It can be foreseen that in a number of different situations a 
state's policy may be so overriding in importance that a judgment 
of another state will not be given preclusive effect. Rather, the 
forum state will proceed to re-examine the matter in light of the 
forum's policy.57 
53 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
154 Id. at 438. 
M Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 895 (1945). 
56 Id. at 230. 
57 The re-examination by the forum state is not limited to the area of judgments, as 
in the second Williams case. It is helpful to observe how the forum re-examines statutes. 
See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). In this case the 
California forum allowed a seasonal worker who was contracted in California but injured 
in Alaska to recover workman's compensation under the California statute e\·en though 
the worker contracted to recover under the Alaska statute. After studying the various 
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Finally, it must be understood that the judgment first handed 
down, even if valid, is subject to all of the limitations which inhere 
in such a judgment in the state rendering it. If it is subject to 
attack in the rendering state, it is subject to the same attack in the 
forum state in the second action. This becomes particularly appar-
ent in the child custody58 and divorce cases. If the first court has 
the power to re-examine the matter and reopen the case, the forum 
has the same power. 
The question of the effect to be given a judgment was posed in 
Maager v. Hoye,59 where a plaintiff started a second action which 
completely paralleled a prior suit brought in a different state. The 
second court held that the first judgment was a bar to the action. 
Referring to the full faith and credit clause, the court stated: 
"[W]hen the judicial proceedings of one state are drawn in 
question before the courts of another state, their regularity 
and validity are to be determined, not by the law of the fo-
rum, but by the law of the state in which the judgment was 
rendered; and ... the judgment of a sister state must be 
given full faith and credit where the court of that state had 
jurisdiction and no extrinsic fraud was shown. Thus, Virginia 
law [the first forum] is determinative of the questions pre-
sented in this action."60 
It is true, though, that if the judgment could be attacked in the 
first state because of fraud involved in the first proceeding then 
conflicting policies, Justice Stone stated: "In the special circumstances disclosed, the 
state [California] had as great an interest in affording adequate protection to this class 
of its population as to employees injured within the state." Id. at 543. "Prima facie every 
state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who 
challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state 
by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational 
basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state arc superior to 
those of the forum. It follows that not every statute of another state will override a con-
flicting statute of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit clause .•.. " Id. 
at 547-48. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 
45 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. I, 7-10 (1945), where the Justice categorizes qualifications on the full 
faith and credit clause as follows: (1) where the forum may inquire into the jurisdiction of 
the rendering court, (2) where the forum's statute of limitations on a suit upon a judgment 
is applied, (3) where the doctrine of forum non conveniens allows the forum not to 
provide a remedy on a former judgment of a sister state if both parties are foreign 
corporations, and (4) where the forum looks into the prior judgment and refuses to en-
force it if it is based upon a penalty. 
58 See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (remanded to consider whether there was 
a change in circumstances which would allow the forum not to be bound by a sister state's 
decree concerning child custody); State ex rel. Girtman v. Riketson, 221 La. 691, 60 So. 2d 
88 (1952) (same). 
59 122 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1954). 
60 Id. at 934. 
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it can be attacked in the second jurisdiction, and there is no viola-
tion of full faith and credit. 
Due Process 
Due process in the adjudicatory process involves the reasona-
bleness of the court's procedure under the circumstances and not 
the nature of the action taken by the court. It is true, however, 
that due process to some extent controls the substantive law ap-
plied and the reasonableness of the action taken. In one isolated 
case, Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania,61 the Supreme Court 
has talked in terms of the due process clause when considering the 
effect of the judgment handed down and has stated that due proc-
ess requires that the first judgment have a total preclusive effect. 
The Court stated that anything less than total protection for the 
losing defendant would violate the due process clause. In this case, 
which involved the escheat statute of the state of Pennsylvania, the 
Court concluded: 
"[W]hen a state court's jurisdiction purports to be based, as 
here, on the presence of property within the State, the holder 
of such property is deprived of due process of law if he is 
compelled to relinquish it without assurance that he will not 
be held liable again in another jurisdiction or in a suit 
brought by a claimant who is not bound by the first judg-
ment."62 
Perhaps this is a reasonable rule in the case of escheat statutes 
because of their particular difficulties.63 But this language is not 
61 !168 U.S. 71 (1961). The law reviews have noted this case extensively. The best 
comments are found in The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 132 (1962) 
and 62 COLUM. L. REv. 708 (1962). 
02 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961). See note 28 supra. 
63 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. See also Security Sav. Bank v. California, 
263 U.S. 282 (1923) (statutory provisions held sufficient under due process). The pressing 
problem in the escheat area is the possibility or probability that several states may claim 
the same property. The first consideration of this is found in Standard Oil Co. v. New 
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951), where the Court suggested that the first judgment of 
escheat would bar other states if they attempted to claim the property through escheat. 
The court suggested that full faith and credit would require this result. This 
interesting idea is found in the following language of that opinion: 
"[W)e consider the notice to the stockholders adequate to support a valid judgment 
against their rights as well as those of the Company. The res is the debt and the same rule 
applies as with tangible property. The debts or demands represented by the stock and 
dividends having been taken from the appellant company by a valid judgment of New 
Jersey, the same debts or demands against appellant cannot be taken by another state. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double escheat." Id. at 443. 
The court then went ahead to suggest that the conflict between states might be resolved 
in the Supreme Court. In ·western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75-76 
(1961), Mr. Justice Black attempted to distinguish the Standard Oil case, but the attempt 
does not seem to have been wholly successful. 
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limited to such statutes and seems to be of general application. 
Consider the situation of an action of replevin brought in a state 
court. Need the plaintiff give the defendant assurances that the 
judgment will protect him against any other claims based upon 
the property? Traditionally, the sole issue has been the relative 
strengths of the claims of the plaintiff and defendant. There is 
always a possibility that there is a third person who may have 
some claim in connection with the property that he may be able 
to assert against the first defendant. The decision in the first suit 
has nothing to do with any other claim which may be asserted. 
Certainly the defendant, if he loses, is forced to "relinquish it 
without assurance that he will not be held liable again in another 
jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is not bound by 
the first judgment."64 
In our adversary system, the courts normally adjudicate the 
relative merits of the claims of the parties involved and do not 
consider the rights of other individuals who possibly have some 
sort of claim which they may be able to assert at some time in the 
future. Certainly the courts do not require any sort of assurance 
that the losing party will not be subjected to other suits by other 
claimants. The Federal Interpleader Act65 was designed to mini-
mize the possibility of multiple claims and multiple liability 
against a single party. But the act itself is a recognition of the 
possibility that, absent the act, there might be multiple claims 
and multiple liability. 
It would seem that the recent statement by the Supreme Court 
should be limited to the escheat situation, and that it would be a 
mistake to extend the language of the opinion to other situations. 
The winning party wins because of his superior claim; he does not 
speak for others and need not assure the losing party that he will 
not be held liable in another suit. Due process does not require 
any assurances of immunity from suit; it does not require that pre-
elusive effect against subsequent liability be a concomitant to the 
judgment handed down. 
Where the claim of preclusion is raised in a second suit, the 
constitutional concept of due process may come into play. The 
supposedly precluded party may claim that his constitutional 
rights have been violated-that he has not received due process. 
In other words, the claim is that the preclusion is a violation of 
due process. 
64 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 63, at 75. 
65 28 u.s.c. § 1335 (1958). 
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If, for example, an action is maintained in one jurisdiction and 
a second suit involving the same issues is then brought between 
the same parties in a second jurisdiction, the preclusive effect of 
the first judgment may involve the concept of due process. Will 
due process ever require the re-examination of an issue in the 
second court, that is, bar the giving of preclusive effect to the first 
judgment? Suppose that the first court has made a mistake in the 
first judgment, can it still be given preclusive effect? Suppose that 
the mistake is one concerning the jurisdiction of the court, is there 
still preclusion? Suppose the first is a default judgment, can the 
second court hold that there is issue preclusion? These are ques-
tions that ultimately may be resolved only in terms of the Con-
stitution. 
The Supreme Court has approached these problems in the 
following terms: 
"[W]hen the judgment of a state court, ascribing to the judg-
ment of another court the binding force and effect of res 
judicata, is challenged for want of due process it becomes the 
duty of this Court to examine the course of procedure in both 
litigations to ascertain whether the litigant whose rights have 
thus been adjudicated has been afforded such notice and 
opportunity to be heard as are requisite to the due process 
which the Constitution prescribes."66 
This language suggests the approach to be used in a situation in-
volving the problem posed. The way this might come before a 
court is suggested in Ford v. Ford,61 recently decided by the Su-
preme Court. Concluding the opinion, the Court stated, "We hold 
that the courts of South Carolina were not precluded by the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause from determining the best interest of 
these children and entering a decree accordingly."68 The Court 
indicated only that the South Carolina courts were not bound by 
the prior judgment in Virginia. This left open the question as to 
whether South Carolina could give preclusive effect to the Vir-
ginia judgment. Thus the due process argument may arise. Here 
the precluded party may claim that his constitutional rights have 
been violated if the first judgment is considered preclusive. 
If the first court was without jurisdiction over the defendant, 
the action of the first court is without basis. The second court can-
not give effect to the judgment so rendered. As the Supreme Court 
66 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
67 371 U.S. 187 (1962). 
68 Id. at 194. 
50 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
stated in Hansberry v. Lee,69 "It is a principle of general applica-
tion in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated 
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process."70 This means that due process bars the execution of such 
a judgment on property of the individual and that the judgment 
can have no preclusive effect against the individual in subsequent 
actions. It is not completely accurate, however, to say that only 
parties are bound by a judgment. Authorities and courts have 
labored over this matter diligently71 and have, as yet, not reached 
any satisfactory conclusion. But it is quite clear that, under certain 
circumstances, a person who has not been made a party by service 
of process may be bound by a judgment handed down in the 
action.72 The controlling question is whether it can be said that 
69 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
10 Id. at 40. 
71 See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 
122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942), where the California Supreme Court, in this landmark decision, 
observed: "Many courts have stated the facile formula that the plea of res judicata is 
available only when there is privity and mutuality of estoppel. ••. Under the require• 
ment of privity, only parties of the former judgment or their privies may take advantage 
of or be bound by it ..•• A privy is one who, after rendition of the judgment, has 
acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one 
of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase .••• The estoppel is mutual if 
the one taking advantage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it, had 
it gone against him." (Emphasis added.) 
Counteracting this "facile formula" is the development of an expanding concept of 
privity and a narrowing requirement of mutuality. REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 83, com-
ment a, defines "privy" as including "those who control an action although not parties 
to it; those whose interests are represented by a party to the action; successors in interest 
to those having derivative claims." It is no wonder that it has been observed that: 
"The question of who is concluded by a judgment has been obscured by the use of 
the words 'privity' and 'privies,' which in their precise technical meaning in law are 
scarcely determinative always of who is and who is not bound by a judgment. Courts 
have striven sometimes to give effect to the general doctrine that a judgment is only 
binding between parties and privies by extending the signification of the word 'privies' 
to include relationships not originally embraced in it, whereas the true reason for 
holding the issue res judicata does not necessarily depend on privity, but on the policy 
of law to end litigation by preventing a party who as had one fair trial of a question of 
fact from again drawing it into controversy." Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 
124, 133, 172 Atl. 260, 263 (1934). 
Flowing from the Coca Cola and Bernhard cases is the idea that due process does not 
restrict the right to assert a plea of preclusion to one who was either a party or in privity 
with a party to the earlier litigation. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. 
Ass'n, supra at 812, 122 P .2d at 894. 
Since the facts in both Coca Cola and Bernhard involved factual situations in which 
the party being bound in the second suit asserted the initiative in both suits as plaintiff, 
the interesting question is whether due process will permit an expansion of the concept 
of focusing upon the party being bound, so that there is privity in situations (1) where 
the party being bound in the second suit was a defendant in the first suit and plaintiff 
in the second or (2) where the party being bound was a defendant in both suits. See 
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 
281 (1957). 
72 See, e.g., Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715, 718-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 
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"the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the in-
terests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."73 If a class is 
involved as a defendant, there are obviously certain factors to be 
considered which are not present if the action is supposedly an 
action seeking a judgment against persons all actually served. But 
the protection of due process shelters all litigants in order to assure 
that they receive fair treatment under the circumstances. 
It may be that the decision of the first court is so ,vrong-so 
grossly ,vrong-as to be impossible "in a rational administration of 
justice."74 This suggests that the action of the court is not, in any 
sense of the word, judicial; that the action is a gross miscarriage 
of justice. At this point the second court should not, and cannot 
under the due process concept, give full faith and credit to such a 
decision. At this point the supposedly precluded party is protected 
by the constitutional doctrine of due process that guarantees the 
individual a day in court-something he has not received in the 
first, precluding suit. 
It can therefore be concluded that due process bars the giving 
of preclusive effect to (I) a judgment rendered by a court without 
a jurisdictional basis to hand down a judgment against the defend-
ant, or (2) a judgment that is grossly ~ong. The Supreme Court 
stated in Griffin v. Griffin: 75 
"A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due proc-
ess is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon 
in another jurisdiction [citing cases]. Moreover, due process 
requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a 
821 (1949) where the court stated: "Under the rule of privity one who purchases property 
after a suit has been begun against the vendor with respect to the property purchased 
is 'chargeable with legal or constructive notice so as to render his purchase subject to the 
event of that suit' even though he may have no actual knowledge of the suit." See United 
States v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Cal. 1951), reversed on other grounds, 196 F.2d 
551 (9th Cir. 1952). Although not a party to the prior action, the Government participated 
in the defense in order to further its own interest. In holding the Government bound as 
a privy to the prior suit, the Court stated: 
"Due process requires that a person shall have an opportunity to be heard by a court 
of competent jurisdiction upon a matter which affects his interests. But the gauging of 
when, in legal contemplation, he has had a day in court is a practical matter which 
searches reality and shuns form .••• [T]he reasons for the preclusion of those who have 
participated in an action are the same as those applicable to parties." Id. at 886. See 
note 79 infra. 
73 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940). The demands of due process do not put 
the judicial process in a strait jacket. Rather there is a great deal of flexibility in these 
demands; the Court has noted that there must be given "a proper regard for divergent 
local institutions and interest." Ibid. 
74 Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 294 F.2d 868, 871 (1st Cir. 
1960). See note 47 supra. 
75 327 U.S. 220 (1946). 
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matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without 
due process [citing Restatement, ]udgments]."76 
Two categories are established by these principles. First, those 
judgments which must be given full faith and credit, and second, 
those judgments, invalid under the due process clause, which can-
not be given preclusive effect. But it would seem that there is a 
third area, a middle ground where (1) full faith and credit does 
not force the second state to recognize as valid and conclusive a 
judgment handed down in the first state, and still (2) preclusive 
effect could be given without violating the due process clause. An 
example might be a judgment rendered in one state subject to 
attack in that state. A second state might refuse to allow an attack 
on such judgment and give preclusive effect to the judgment, not 
because of full faith and credit, but rather because of comity or 
res judicata. If the proceedings in the first state met the require-
ments of due process, then certainly the second state court could 
hold the judgment binding on the parties in that state. 
In giving effect to the judgment rendered by the first court, 
the second court may make an incorrect decision as to the action 
of the first court. Even if this is clearly wrong, it is not a denial 
of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has stated: 
"It [the second court] may be mistaken upon what to it is 
matter of fact, the law of the other State. But a mere mistake 
of that kind is not a denial of due process of law. . . . When-
ever a wrong judgment is entered against a defendant his 
property is taken when it should not have been, but what-
ever the ground may be, if the mistake is not so gross as to be 
impossible in a rational administration of justice, it is no 
more than the imperfection of man, not a denial of constitu-
tional rights."77 
So a mistake by itself does not raise a constitutional issue, but an 
egregious error may raise one. 
When an attempt is made to extend the concept of preclusion 
to include more and more individuals, 78 the due process concept 
may become even more important. Under this constitutional pro-
vision, every individual is entitled to his day in court. Thus the 
attempt to be more inclusive in the application of the doctrine of 
preclusion79 at some point reaches a constitutional limitation. The 
76 Id. at 228-29. 
77 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 224 U.S. 25, 30 (1917). 
78 See notes 71 & 72 supra and accompanying text. 
70 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940), where Mr. Justice Stone stated: "It 
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Constitution requires fair treatment of the parties to be precluded. 
Anything less is invalid and unconstitutional as a denial of due 
process.80 
Right to Trial by Jury 
Should two claims be pending in the same federal court be-
tween the same parties wherein one claim is at law and the other 
is in equity, the court theoretically has the option of trying either 
claim first. Should there be common questions of fact in the two 
claims, it would follow that the first decision would have a pre-
elusive effect on the common claims. This question arose in Bea-
con Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,81 decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, wherein the Court stated: 
" 'In the Federal courts this [jury] right cannot be dispensed 
with, except by the assent of the parties entitled to it; nor 
can it be impaired by any blending with a claim, properly 
cognizable at law, of a demand for equitable relief in aid of 
the legal action or during its pendency.' This long-standing 
principle of equity dictates that only under the most impera-
tive circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible 
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, 
can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior 
determination of equitable claims."82 
The attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States toward 
this right to trial by jury was emphasized in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.83 wherein the Court stated: 
is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent other members in a 
litigation .... It is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively 
either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so that any group, 
merely because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to represent 
any others of the class in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a selection 
of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily 
or even probably the same as those whom they arc deemed to represent, does not afford 
that protection to absent parties which due process requires." 
80 See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 354 (1941), where the Court stated 
that "if the effect of a probate decree in Georgia in personam was to bar a stranger to 
the decree from later asserting his rights, such a holding would deny procedural due 
process.'' 
81 !359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
82 Id. at 510-11. Whether this concept would be applied in all its vigor in state courts 
in comparable situations cannot be stated. But in light of state constitutional provisions 
dealing with the right to trial by jury, it is conceivable that state courts might reach the 
same conclusion. However, to date no state court has cited the Beacon Theatre case. 
83 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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"An essential characteristic of ... [the federal] system is the 
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes 
trial functions between judge and jury and, under the in-
fluence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, 
assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the 
jury."84 
Here the significance of trial by jury was held to be a countervail-
ing consideration against the doctrine of the Erie case.85 The right 
to trial by jury was so fundamental that the requirement of uni-
formity would fall before it. This sanctity of the trial by jury has 
been most recently reflected in Simler v. Conner,86 where, in a per 
curiam opinion, the Court noted that "The federal policy favoring 
jury trials is of historic and continuing strength."87 
One might then well consider the situation of a law action 
pending in a federal court with a comparable action pending on 
the equity side of a state court, there being some fact issues com-
mon to the two actions. Suppose the state court should adjudicate 
the matter first. Would a federal court be bound by the fact issues 
decided? Certainly there is no clear-cut answer to the problem, 
but obviously the federal court will protect the right to trial by 
jury, and it might well decide that the prior decision in the 
equity action in the state court was simply a device to circumvent 
the jury trial. If this were true, it would seem that there would be 
no preclusion. 
The recent Supreme Court cases suggest that in the federal 
courts the right to trial by jury is so basic that it will be protected 
against any possible encroachment. Trial order must be such as 
to protect this right to trial by jury, and preclusive effect will not 
be given to a roughly contemporaneous equitable decree except 
under the most unusual circumstances. 
Equal Protection of the Laws 
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides in 
section one that "No state shall ... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional 
limitation might have some application in the area of preclusion 
84 Id. at 537. 
85 See Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248, 262-71 (1963) 
for a discussion of the Byrd case in relation to the Erie R.R. case. 
86 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (right to jury trial in suit against lawyer for charging unreason-
able fees in diversity cases determined by federal law). 
87 Id. at 222. 
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if a state should ever attempt to give certain judgments preclusive 
effect according to the persons involved. This might well involve a 
classification of persons which would be unconstitutional under 
the equal protection clause. The state, of course, can make rea-
sonable classifications based upon some rational criteria.88 But 
there is a line beyond which the states cannot go. 
This might become a very real problem where there is diver-
gency in the treatment of judgments. If the forum court decides 
that a judgment is subject to attack under the full faith and credit 
provision since the rendering state would allow an attack, this 
avoids that constitutional matter; but it certainly does not solve 
all the problems. Suppose the law of the second state would not 
permit such an attack upon a domestic judgment of the same type. 
Can the foreign judgment then be so attacked? Or does the equal 
protection clause require the same treatment, regarding preclusion, 
of domestic and foreign judgments? This raises some extremely 
interesting problems. 
The distinction between full faith and credit, equal protection, 
and preclusion was considered in Camp v. Camp.89 There the 
New York court was faced with a collateral attack on a Florida 
divorce decree. The court first considered the Florida law on col-
lateral attacks on such decrees and found that that state would 
allow such a decree to be set aside. The court stated that "the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause ... and sec. 1738 of title 28 of the 
United States Code ... permit collateral attack in the forum where 
such attack would be permitted in the rendering State .... " 90 The 
New York court examined its own law concerning res judicata 
88 See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In upholding a state 
statute prohibiting a land owner from pumping on his own land so as to deplete the 
subterranean mineral supply common to him and other owners, the Court stated that 
this was not a denial of equal protection of the laws because: 
"Each State possesses the general power to prescribe the evidence which shall be 
received and the effect which shall be given it in her own courts, and may exert this 
power by providing that proof of a particular fact, or of several taken collectively, shall 
be prima facie evidence of another fact. Many such exertions of this power are shown 
in the legislation of several States, and their validity, as against the present objection, 
has been uniformly recognized save where they have been found to be merely abitrary 
mandates or to discriminate invidiously between different persons in substantially the 
same situation." Id. at 81-82. 
See Mobile, J. &: K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910) (upheld state statute abro-
gating fellow-servant rule as to all employees of railroad even though many employees 
were not endangered to the same degree as those in the actual operation of trains); Adams 
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1903) (state statute was not unconstitutional because it provided 
an e.xception for "public officers," since the only rational meaning would be to limit the 
exception to officers of the law). 
80 21 Misc. 2d 908, 189 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
oo Id. at 913, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 566. 
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and comity and concluded that a collateral attack was permissible 
under that state's law. It concluded that no constitutional dis-
crimination occurs if New York permits such a Florida decree to 
be collaterally attacked. The court said specifically on this point: 
"[S]ince New York will permit collateral attack upon its 
own divorce judgments, whether voidable only or absolutely 
void, ... no unconstitutional discrimination (U. S. Const. art. 
IV, § 2 ... ) occurs when New York permits such a Florida 
decree to be collaterally attacked."91 
The inference is obvious that, had New York not allowed the 
collateral attack on one of its judgments under the circumstances, 
the equal protection clause might have limited the power of the 
state court in permitting such an attack on the Florida judgment. 
Although this conclusion might not be reached by the court in the 
future if there should be a classification according to the forum 
rendering the judgment, it does indicate the general nature of the 
equal protection limitation: at some point a classification for 
preclusive purposes may be held unconstitutional as violative of 
the equal protection provmon. 
SUMMARY 
It must be concluded that there are a number of federal con-
stitutional concepts which are important in the area of preclusion. 
The fundamentals of the doctrine of preclusion operate in a wide 
range, it is true, but the Constitution draws certain lines about 
its impact. In the interest of fairness to the litigants, the Con-
stitution imposes certain due process limitations. The requirement 
of fair trial under the federal scheme is found also in the protec-
tion of the right to trial by jury. The possible involvement of 
equal protection suggests an interest in the fair treatment of the 
individuals involved. Finally, the national character is protected 
by the requirements of full faith and credit. 
All of these suggest that, at these junctures, very important 
considerations become involved. Decisions are arrived at only with 
great difficulty. An understanding of the principles involved will 
allow a discussion of the matters in meaningful terms, and will 
certainly make the resolution of such problems somewhat easier. 
91 Ibid. 
